Criminal Law -- Assault on a Female --  Show of Violence  Rule in North Carolina by Meekins, Frederick C.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 36 | Number 2 Article 9
2-1-1958
Criminal Law -- Assault on a Female -- "Show of
Violence" Rule in North Carolina
Frederick C. Meekins
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frederick C. Meekins, Criminal Law -- Assault on a Female -- "Show of Violence" Rule in North Carolina, 36 N.C. L. Rev. 198 (1958).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol36/iss2/9
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
plication remains to be seen from future litigation, s but the present
decision would seem to be conducive to greater freedom of expression
in this area. In the meantime, North Carolina-a state which has ap-
parently never had an obscenity case reach its highest court-stands in
the unique position of having an obscenity statute which, properly
applied,5 9 ranks with the most modem and liberal in the nation and
represents an acme toward which the law appears to be presently moving.
DAVID E. BUCKNER
Criminal Law-Assault on a Female-"Show of Violence"
Rule in North Carolina
In State v. Allen,1 the evidence tended to show that the defendant
followed prosecutrix in his automobile on several occasions as she
walked to a place on a public street where she customarily awaited her
ride to work, that the defendant stopped within a few feet of prosecutrix
but made no attempt to approach her or to communicate with her in
any way, that defendant gazed constantly at her, making motions with
the lower part of his body, and that because of fear of him, prosecutrix
quit walking the usual way to the place for her ride. These acts, on
the occasion before his arrest, caused prosecutrix to run to the steps of
a public school. This evidence was held sufficient to go to the jury in
a prosecution for assault on a female.2
The principal case is the latest of several recent borderline cases of
assault on a female which have been brought before the North Carolina
Supreme Court, and it serves well to illustrate the difficult problem
confronting the court in determining whether or not the particular acts
of a defendant are sufficient in law to constitute the criminal offense.3
" In three per curiam decisions since the preparation of this Note, the Court has
struck down prohibitions on the mailing of magazines which lower courts had held
to be obscene, as well as a similar ban on the showing of a motion picture. In all
of these cases the Court relied upon its decision in the Roth case.
See One, Inc. v. Olesen, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3204 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1958) reversbtg
241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) (over-turning the lower court's affirmance of a post-
office ban on "One," a magazine concerned with homosexuality, on grounds that
it was obscene) ; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3204 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1958), reversing 128 F. Supp. 564 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (nudist magazines,
Sunshine and Health and Sun Magazine, not excludable from the mails as obscene) ;
Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957), reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7th
Cir. 1957) (reversing Chicago censorship of the French motion picture "Game of
Love" on obscenity grounds). The Court's only explanation of these one-sentence
decisions was in its citation of the Roth case. Their inference, however, would seem
to be that the Court has imposed tight limits on permissible censorship for
obscenity. See also, Lewis, Censorsip Limited in 'Obscenity' Cases, The New
York Times, January 19, 1958, § E, p. 9, col. 6-8.
" See note 16 supra.
245 N.C. 185, 95 S.E.2d 526 (1956).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (1953).
Technically, assault on a female is not a specific type of assault, as the degrees
of assault specified by statute relate to the extent of punishment and do not create
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The facts in this case present a very close question, and in many
jurisdictions it is doubtful that the conviction .would have been sus-
tained;4 particularly where the offense is prosecuted under definitive
criminal statutes, most of which define the crime as an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury upon the person
of another.5 In North Carolina, there is no statutory definition of
assault, and the crime remains one governed by the rules of the com-
mon law.
The common law offense of assault is generally defined as an
intentional offer or attempt,6 by force or violence,7 to do physical injury
to the person of another.8 Under this rule, a present intent to inflict
bodily harm is essential ;9 but it may be inferred from the acts, and if the
act itself is essentially wrongful or unlawful, intent will be presumed.10
There must be an overt act," amounting to an attempt,12 and mere
words, however insulting or abusive, will not constitute an assault,
because however violent they may be, they cannot take the place of that
force required to complete the offense.' 8 Violence, threatened or offered,
is an essential element, and mere preparation to do violence will not
suffice.14  A split of authority exists on the question of whether there
need be actual present ability to inflict the injury, and North Carolina
separate offenses. State v. Lefler, 202 N.C. 700, 163 S.E. 873 (1932). Further,
an assault on a female by a boy or man over 18 years of age is a general misde-
meanor, punishable in the discretion of the court. State v. Floyd, 241 N.C. 298,
84 S.E.2d 915 (1954); State v. Church, 231 N.C. 39, 55 S.E.2d 792 (1949);
State v. Jackson, 226 N.C. 66, 36 S.E.2d 706 (1946).
"Compare State v. Allen, 245 N.C. 185, 95 S.E.2d 526 (1956) with Loid v.
State, 55 Tex. Crim. 403, 116 S.W. 807 (1909).
'E.g., "Any attempt to commit a battery, or any threatening gesture showing
in itself or by words accompanying it, an immediate intention, coupled with an
ability to commit a battery, is an assault .... By the term 'coupled with an
ability to commit,' . . . is meant: 1. That the person making the assault must be
in such a position that, if not prevented, he may inflict a battery upon the person
assailed. 2. That he must be within such distance of the person so assailed as to
make it within his power to commit the battery by the use of the means with which
he attempts it." TEx. PEN. CoDE arts. 1138, 1141 (1948). See also Brimhall v.
State, 31 Ariz. 522, 255 Pac. 165 (1927) ; Ex parte McLeod, 23 Idaho 257, 128
Pac. 1106 (1913) ; People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac. 800 (1892).
' For a distinction between "offer" and "attemp' see State v. Myerfield, 61
N.C. 108 (1867).
" The terms "violence" and "force" are synonymous when used in relation to
assault. People v. James, 9 Cal. App. 2d 162, 48 P.2d 1011 (1935).
8 State v. Sutt6n, 228 N.C. 534, 46 S.E.2d 310 (1948); State v. Hefner, 199
N.C. 778, 155 S.E. 879 (1930) ; State v. Reavis, 113 N.C. 677, 18 S.E. 388 (1893);
State v. Davis, 23 N.C. 125 (1840).
' State v. Hemphill, 162 N.C. 632, 78 S.E. 167 (1913) ; State v. McAfee, 107
N.C. 812, 12 S.E. 435 (1890) ; State v. Myerfield, 61 N.C. 108 (1867) ; State v.
Crow, 23 N.C. 375 (1841).
'o State v. Hemphill, supra note 9.
'x State v. Ingram, 237 N.C. 197, 74 S.E.2d 532 (1953); State v. Morgan, 25
N.C. 186 (1842).
" State v. Davis, 23 N.C. 125 (1840).
"i State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 48 S. E. 544 (1904); State v. Morgan, 25
N.C. 186 (1843) ; State v. Davis, supra note 12.
" State v. Davis, supra note 12.
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requires only that there be an apparent present ability, reasoning that
it is the imminent danger threatened which is decisive rather than the
actual ability to inflict the injury.15
If the principal case had been governed strictly by the above rules,
it is likely that the defendant's motion for nonsuit would have been
allowed.' Through the application of a somewhat broadened rule
which has developed in North Carolina, as well as in a number of other
jurisdictions,1? the acts of the defendant take on a different hue and
present a question for the jury. The rule, as stated by the court in the
Allen case, is as follows: "A show of violence, causing the 'reasonable
apprehension of immediate bodily harm' . . . whereby another is put in
fear, and thereby forced to leave a place where he has a right to be, is
sufficient to make out a case of assault.""'
The rule, of course, is not original with the Allen case. It evolved
from dicta in earlier cases where the threatened u se of weapons caused
the person assailed to retreat, to change his course, or to leave a place
sooner than he had intended.' 9 Perhaps the first clear statement of the
principle was made in State v. Shipman,20 where the rule was adopted
as a part of the law in North Carolina with respect to criminal assault;
since that time, it has governed in numerous adjudications on the sub-
ject by the court.
Thus, in North Carolina, there are two rules, either or both of
which may be applied in prosecuting a defendant for an alleged assault:
(1) the general common law rule, and (2) the "show of violence" rule.
Under the former, the emphasis is upon the state of mind of the person
accused.21 Under the latter, the emphasis shifts to a consideration of the
apprehension of the person assailed, limited by the requirement that the
" If a reasonable man would be led to believe that he would immediately
receive injury unless some force intervened, the assailant is within striking distance,
even though not near enough to reach the person assailed. State v. Martin, 85
N.C. 508 (1881). And see State v. McIver, 231 N.C. 313, 56 S.E.2d 604 (1949).
6 It seems reasonable that the defendant's acts could amount to no more than
a preparation to do violence, as distinguished from violence begun to be executed.
Can it be said as a matter of law that these acts amount to an offer to do im-
mediate physical injury? Or an attempt? See State v. Milsaps, 82 N.C. 549(1880) (using insulting language, and picking up a stone about 12 feet from
complainant, but not offering to throw it, held not to constitute an assault, but
only a menace of violence).
17 See, e.g., Cittadino v. State, 199 Miss. 235, 24 So. 2d 93 (1946); State v.
Hazen, 160 Kan. 733, 165 P.2d 234 (1946) ; State v. Lynn, 184 S.W.2d 760 (Mo.
App. 1945) ; State v. Rush, 14 Wash. 2d 138, 127 P.2d 411 (1942).
"8 State v. Allen, 245 N.C. 185, 189, 95 S.E.2d 526, 529 (1956).
1" State v. Rawles, 65 N.C. 334 (1871) (manure fork, hoe and gun); State v.
Church, 63 N.C. 15 (1868) (pistol, uncocked).
so81 N.C. 513 (1879).
"The element of fear or apprehension on the part of the person against whom
the attempt is made cannot be controlling, or in any way influence the determination
of the criminal liability of the aggressor, for the reason that "one may obviously be
assaulted although in complete ignorance of the fact, and therefore entirely free
from alarm." State v. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 302, 20 Pac. 625, 628 (1889). See
also People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 525, 5 N.W. 982 (1880).
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apprehension be reasonable. The state of mind of the accused is no
longer the determining factor in those cases where the "show of violence"
rule is applied.22
Under the "show of violence" rule, it appears that there are three
basic elements: (1) a show of violence; (2) reasonable apprehension
of immediate bodily harm or injury; and (3) such apprehension and
fear causing the person assailed to leave a place where he had a right
to be, or to restrain from some act or conduct which he had a right to
exercise. The apprehension of the assailed, and a showing that such
fear and apprehension caused the assailed to forego some legal right,
become necessary parts of the evidence to be considered in determining
the guilt or innocence of the accused.23 With the possible exception of
the third element, it is evident that this rule is, in effect, the identical
rule used in cases where the plaintiff seeks compensation for damages he
has suffered as a result of a civil assault. 24 The traditional distinction
between civil assault and criminal assault vanishes where the rule is
applied in criminal prosecutions. 25
Although the "show of violence" rule has been applied in various
types of assault cases, it has had its most frequent application in cases
of assault on a female. There has been a definite trend in North Carolina
to extend criminal liability in this area. The question as to what acts
of a defendant are sufficient to constitute a show of violence is difficult,
if not impossible, to answer. An examination of the leading cases pre-
sents the only reasonable approach.
In State v. Williams,26 words amounting to an indecent proposal
were held to be a sufficient display of force when taken in light of the
fact that they were made by a negro man on several occasions to a fifteen
year old white girl, causing her to become so frightened that she fled
in a direction that she had not intended to go.
In State v. Sutton,27 the accused, in a drunken condition, entered the
office where the prosecutrix worked, asked her a proper question, and
followed her into the hall, staring at her constantly. She became
frightened, screamed, and ran up the steps as the defendant ran up the
steps behind her. This was held to be a sufficient show of violence
22 "Whether there has been an assault in a particular case depends more on
the apprehension created in the mind of the person assaulted than upon the
undisclosed intention of the person committing the assault." State v. Rush, 14
Wash. 2d 138, 139, 127 P.2d 411, 412 (1942) citing Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug &
Barge Co., 13 Wash. 2d 485, 125 P.2d 681 (1942).
" State v. Stansberry, 197 N.C. 350, 148 S.E. 546 (1929) (by implication).
2" See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 21 (1934).
25 For a comparison of civil assault with criminal assault, emphasizing the
importance of apparent ability and apprehension in civil actions, see Note, 30
TEX. L. REv. 120 (1951).25186 N.C. 627, 120 S.E. 224 (1923).
"228 N.C. 534, 46 S.E.2d 310 (1948).
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to sustain a conviction, although these facts amount to an assault under
either rule.
In State v. Mclve, 28 upon facts strikingly similar to those in the
Williams case, the court held that if the character of the threat were
such as to cause another to go where she would not otherwise have gone,
or to leave a place where she had a right to be, that this was sufficient
to make out an assault. The conclusion to be drawn from the Williams
and McIver cases is that words amounting to an indecent proposal,
where made on repeated occasions, 29 may, of themselves, constitute a
sufficient show of violence if they cause reasonable fear in the prosecutrix
whereby she leaves a place where she had a right to be.80
In State v. Ingram,3 1 the famous "leering" case, the defendant drove
his automobile slowly along a public road and "leered" at the prosecutrix
some distance away. She became frightened and began to run upon
hearing the motor of the automobile stop, although she could not see
the defendant because of a small wooded area between the prosecutrix
and the place where the automobile was stopped. Upon clearing the
woods, the prosecutrix resumed walking, and when she saw the defendant
approaching, some sixty-five or seventy feet away, she continued walk-
ing to her destination. The conviction of the lower court was reversed,
the court saying: "It cannot be said that a pedestrian may be assaulted
by a look, however frightening, from a person riding in an automobile
some distance away."3 2 Although both rules are mentioned, it is not
clear whether the case turned on the finding of the court (a) that there
was no overt act, or (b) that the fear occasioned by the prosecutrix
was not reasonable under the circumstances. In either event, the case
cast some doubt upon the future applicability of the "show of violence"
rule in North Carolina.
The holding in the principal case clarifies any misunderstanding in
this latter respect, and definitely establishes the fact that both rules are
in full force today in this jurisdiction.
Failure to observe the distinction between civil and criminal liability
has resulted in conflict, as well as confusion, among the authorities. It
has unquestionably tended to enlarge the scope of the criminal law as it
pertains to assault. Perhaps there is some merit in the criticism ad-
vanced by some writers that through the use of the civil rule as a
standard in criminal prosecutions, a danger has arisen that unsuspecting
28 231 N.C. 313, 56 S.E.2d 604 (1949).
2" Words amounting to an indecent proposal where made only on one occasion
did not constitute a show of violence. State v. Silver, 227 N.C. 352, 42 S.E.2d
208 (1947).
28Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 967, 974 (1950).
" 237 N.C. 197, 74 S.E.2d 532 (1953).3" Id. at 202, 74 S.E.2d at 536.
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males may find themselves prosecuted for crimes heretofore unknown.33
On the other hand, there is strong argument in favor of its use. The
individual right of citizens to be free from fear and apprehension of
injury by such offensive and threatening conduct as displayed in the
principal case deserves the protection of the state. Through the use
of such a rule, a gap in the criminal law has effectively been closed.
A definitive statute might bring more certainty to a field of the law
where certainty is of the utmost importance.
FREDERICK C. MEEKINS
Domestic Relations-Procedure-Abatement of Actions by
Pendency of Prior Actions
The question as to whether a pending action in the alimony-divorce
area will abate a subsequent independent action in the same area with
the parties reversed has again been passed on by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in the case of Beeson v. Beeson.'
The court initially held in Cook v. Cook2 that where the husband
commenced proceedings for absolute divorce and the wife thereafter
sued for divorce from bed and board in separate proceedings and during
pendency of the husband's prior suit, the former action did not abate
the latter. This decision seems to indicate that although a divorce action,
either absolute or from bed and board, may be brought as a counterclaim,
such is not mandatory. Later, however, the court in Cameron v.
Cameron3 held that whether the first action abated the second depended
upon certain well established tests.
The facts in the Cameron case were substantially as follows: The
wife sued for divorce from bed and board alleging abandonment. While
this suit was pending, the husband instituted an independent action in
a different county for absolute divorce on the grounds of two years
separation.4 The wife pleaded the pendency of her action in abatement
of the husband's subsequent suit. Her plea was sustained by the
Supreme Court. After stating the general rule to be that a subsequent
action is not abatable on the ground that the plaintiff therein might ob-
tain the same relief by a counterclaim or cross demand in a prior suit
pending against him, the court pointed out that this general rule is not
applicable where the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in the seccind
action is essentially a part of the first action and will necessarily be
"A Survey of the Decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court for the
Spring and Fall terms of 1953, 32 N.C.L. Ray. 379, 425 (1954). Cf. Notes, 13
U. DET. L.J. 227 (1950), 11 RocKY MT. L. Rzv. 104 (1939).
-246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17 (1957).
'159 N.C. 47, 74 S.E.2d 639 (1912).
'235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
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